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Following the growth, employment and redistribution
(GEAR) programme in June 1996, South Africa saw an
acceleration in the privatisation of service delivery. This
paper reports on a study of two longer-term
public–private partnerships (PPPs) in the water and
sanitation sector undertaken in Queenstown and Dolphin
Coast. The case studies offer important insights into a
number of factors that determine the effectiveness of
PPPs, including quality and quantity of services, workers,
municipal tariffs for water and sanitation, customer
management and impact on the poor. The case study
findings are used to assess the general risks to main
stakeholders involved in PPPs (the concessionaire, council
and community) and to provide universal lessons on the
conditions under which PPPs in the water and sanitation
sector work best.
1. BACKGROUND TO THE RESEARCH
This paper is based on a research project that was initiated to
look into public–private partnerships (PPPs) in the context of
poverty alleviation.1–3 PPPs are relatively new arrangements
and one of the key objectives of this research was to fill some of
the gaps that exist in evidence-based reporting of the facts and
issues around the impacts of PPP on poor consumers. The case
studies undertaken in South Africa reveal factors that determine
the effectiveness of PPPs, and thus lead to a better
understanding of the conditions under which such arrangements
work best.
2. ROLE OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR IN SERVICE
DELIVERY
The PPP consists of a relationship, usually backed by a contract,
in which the private sector is committed to the major
responsibilities of the utility (financing, ownership, operation,
cost recovery) and/or commits investment funds and shares in
commercial risk, as opposed to simple contracting-out
arrangements between the public sector and a private operator.
The relative merits of private sector participation in the water
and sanitation sector have been extensively debated in the
literature. Partnerships between government and the private
sector in the area of water and sanitation are recommended for
local governments as both an alternative financing mechanism
and a way to improve the productivity, quality and cost
effectiveness of services through changing the incentives
operating in service delivery.4 The scope of private sector
involvement in water and sanitation ranges from the delivery of
services, maintenance of installations, meter reading, collection
of service payments and data processing. The participation of
the private sector in service delivery, although not necessarily
ownership of assets, has been widely adopted in developed
countries and advocated by donors in developing countries as
part of economic reform.
Nevertheless, the water and sanitation sector is considered as
the least profitable and most risky urban service sector. Water
and sanitation services are more attractive to the private sector
in countries with buoyant economies (and thus high
concentrations of income) or in countries with high
concentrations of population. Increasing service provision
directly to the poor is generally considered to add risk and
expense to the enterprise.
3. THE POLICY AND LEGISLATIVE CONTEXT IN
SOUTH AFRICA
Post-apartheid South Africa inherited a massive backlog in the
provision of basic services to previously disadvantaged
communities. Local authorities faced the challenges of
upgrading and developing previously neglected areas under
their jurisdiction. The policy trend towards PPPs for water and
sanitation has seen the preparation of enabling legislation for
private sector participation.
(a) The Constitution of South Africa Act 108 of 1996
(especially sections 151–164) grants all citizens an equal
and inalienable right to water, and requires the state to
fulfil these rights.5
(b) The growth, employment and redistribution (GEAR) policy
provided an impetus in both policy and practice for
partnerships with the for-profit private sector, cost recovery
principles and ‘fiscal discipline’ to meet service backlogs.6
(c) The Water Services Act 108 of 1997 confers on local
governments the power to enter into contracts with private
partners to provide water and sanitation services.7
(d ) The Municipal Systems Act No. 32 of 2000 provides for a
specific regulatory framework for municipal service
partnership and local authority water bylaws that are
developed by each local authority.8
(e) In response to union concerns regarding universal service
coverage, wide-scale retrenchment and anti-union policies,
the White Paper on municipal services partnerships9
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makes clear that the public sector is the preferred mode of
delivery.
( f ) White Paper on Basic Household Sanitation in 2001 calls
for universal access to basic sanitation by March 2010, with
priority accorded to communities with the greatest needs.
(g) The second White Paper on water supply and sanitation
policy (2002) established the need for further
decentralization in the sector, limiting DWAF’s role to
policy and regulation. In rural areas this policy of
decentralization was supported by the Masibambane
program (2001–2004), the first-ever sector-wide approach
linked to budget-based donor support for rural water supply
and sanitation in South Africa.
4. WATER AND SANITATION FOR THE POOR
At the time of the first democratic elections in 1994, 14 million
South Africans did not have access to clean drinking water and
21 million people did not have adequate sanitation; 14% of
South Africans had no form of refuse removal and over 20
million people did not have access to electricity.10 President
Motlanthe reviewed government progress against its objectives
in his state of the nation address in February 2009.11 He stated
that by 2008 access to potable water has improved from 62% in
1996 to 88% in 2008; and access to basic sanitation from 52%
to 73%. Increased coverage has been facilitated by a
combination of six kilolitres (cubic metres) of free water per
month (40 l/capita/day for a family of five or 25 l/capita/day for
a family of eight, cross-subsidies by way of block tariff and
targeted credits available to assist poorer households, and other
capital funds provided by national and provincial government
(such as the municipal infrastructure investment framework).
Nevertheless, approximately 6 million people are still without
potable water and many more are without sanitation.
Pre-paid meters have been introduced in a number of cities in
South Africa. These meters cut off water supply above the 6
cubic meter monthly limit if no payment is made. Residents of
Phiri, a neighborhood in Soweto, have sued against pre-paid
meters. In April 2008 the South African High Court found this
practice unconstitutional, the judge stated that ‘25 liters per
person per day is insufficient for the residents of Phiri’, and
ordered the city to provide free basic water in the amount of 50
liters per person per day with the option of an ordinary credit-
metered water supply (instead of pre-paid) for more use.
5. METHODOLOGY
At the onset of the study, the literature on PPPs (and more
specifically PPPs in South Africa) was reviewed. The
information obtained constituted a useful database for this
study.
Interviews were conducted with key informants in the Dolphin
Coast and Queenstown areas. Informants included members of
the municipality, including the municipal manager and other
senior officials of the municipality directly involved in the PPP,
ward councillors and the representatives from the operators
(Water and Sanitation Services South Africa (Pty) Ltd (WSSA) in
Queenstown and Siza Water Company in the Dolphin Coast).
In-depth household questionnaires were conducted in
Queenstown. A total of 22 household questionnaires were
completed in different wards in eZibeleni and Mlungisi.
A focus group discussion was held at the councillor’s chambers
of the municipality with 14 councillors representing different
wards in eZibeleni and Mlungisi in Queenstown. In the Dolphin
Coast area focus group discussions were conducted with
consumers.
6. CASE STUDIES
6.1. Queenstown
Queenstown is the sub-regional administrative, commercial and
service centre of the midlands region of the Eastern Cape
Province in South Africa. It is a predominantly poor town with
a population of approximately 200 000 (see Table 112). It
comprises three distinct areas
(a) the original municipal area of Queenstown, characterised by
a relatively high-income population and a busy retail
centre
(b) Mlungisi, a former provincially administered township
(c) eZibeleni, a formerly Transkei administered township.
In 1989, Queenstown municipality experienced problems that
affected its ability adequately to provide municipal services.
There were concerns that this would lead to deterioration of the
existing services and resulted, in 1992, in a concession contract
between the municipal and the joint venture Water and
Sanitation Services Africa (WSSA) for a period of 25 years. The
Queenstown contract is an example where adjustments have
been made to existing contracts during operation in order to
improve services for the urban poor. The Queenstown
concession contract was intended to serve white areas only (a
population of 22,000) but was subsequently expanded in 1995
(following democratic elections) to service black areas – an
extra 170,000 inhabitants of the predominantly low-income
areas Mlungisi and Ezibeleni. WSSA, a joint venture with
Group Five.
The contract includes the management of raw water supply,
water treatment, water distribution reticulation, wastewater
reticulation and wastewater treatment. The operator is obliged
to provide, repair and replace the water and sewer networks,
including new connections and civil structures, in consultation
and agreement with the municipality throughout the contract
duration. WSSA bears the operational costs (such as manpower,
energy, consumables and chemicals) of water and wastewater
management. WSSA must also meet all the prescribed standards
and performance criteria specified in the contract, that is water
quality standards and minimum required pressure.
Issues of public interest such as the setting of tariffs, standards
and level of service are the responsibility of the municipality.
Monthly income: Ra Population: %
<800 50
800–1500 24
1500–3500 14
>3500 12
 1 South African rand $US 0.10
Table 1. Household income distribution in Queenstown in
199712
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The contract provides a framework for the municipality to
monitor and regulate the contract in respect of all contractual
performance obligations. The municipality can impose a penalty
per hour per consumer on the operator should it fail to deliver
services to the required quality and availability (this penalty has
been imposed once for one day’s service over the last ten years).
At the end of the contract, all assets – including those installed
under the contract – will be handed over to the municipality.
Under this contract WSSA has full responsibility for operating
and maintaining the service but does not have a direct
contractual relationship with consumers. Nevertheless, WSSA
developed a service charter (related to performance areas and
compliance standards) that provides explicit guidelines for the
provision of services.
Interviews with poor households indicated that water quality is
good, meters are read regularly and bills are received regularly.
However non-payment is still high (an estimated 40–45% of
households), mainly due to low incomes and unemployment in
the area. Despite adopting a stepped tariff structure and six
kilolitres of free basic water, residents still reported that water
and sanitation tariffs are unaffordable to poor households,
particularly larger households and those with big vegetable
gardens. In particular, the tariffs for waterborne sewerage are
beyond the majority of households’ ability and willingness to
pay. There is also some dissatisfaction with the household’s new
responsibility for leaks on private property.
6.2. Dolphin Coast
The borough of Dolphin Coast (BoDC), north of central Durban,
consists of two parallel strips: an affluent zone on the east coast
and poor residential communities in the west. The majority of
households on the west side earn less than R800 ($ 400) per
month while the majority of households on the east earn more
than R3500/per month (see Tables 2 and 3). The Dolphin Coast
area depends on tourism for its survival; this results in a sharp
inflow of people with great pressure on urban infrastructure and
services.
In 1996 the BoDC decided to seek a private partner in its water
and sanitation service in response to resource constraints. A
long-term exclusive concession contract was believed to be the
best option for improved management and capital investment
while stopping short of divestment.1
After winning the bid, SAUR Services (the South African arm of
SAUR International) formed a local company, Siza Water
Company (SWC), a consortium of five partners. The borough
council signed a 30-year contract with Umgeni Water and SWC
worth R4 million per year, whereby SWC buys water from
Umgeni and distributes it to retail consumers in the Dolphin
Coast area. Umgeni is involved in water management and is the
largest bulk water supplier in the province of KwaZulu-Natal,
South Africa. SWC has been responsible for the provision of
water and sanitation services to the Dolphin Coast since 1 April
1999 (see Figure 1).
As the concessionaire, SWC was granted the right to ‘possess,
use, operate, manage, maintain, rehabilitate, redesign, remove,
improve and expand’ the existing works at its own risk and
cost. The company is also expected to meet prescribed levels
of service that are based on affordability and to take full
commercial risk by maintaining and developing the
infrastructure, providing the service, billing customers and
being responsible for tariff collection. BoDC, through
government grants, made a considerable investment in
infrastructure in the Dolphin Coast area shortly before SWC
took over responsibility for the system.
The borough is responsible for determining tariffs using an
agreed formula based on a five-year period. The five-year tariff
Number of households in Population
(estimate)
Formal
housing
Informal
housing
Nkobongo 1318 1000 9 931
Etete 328 1500 7 476
Shakashead 333 500 3 499
Formal towns 5500 0 15 400
Total 7479 3000 36 306
Table 2. Population of Dolphin Coast according to BoDC officials
Monthly income: % of population
<R800 R800–R1500 R1500–R3500 >R3500
Nkobongo 61 25 11 2
Etete 62 26 11 2
Shakashead 62 26 11 2
Formal towns 6 7 28 59
Table 3. Income in BoDC by area
Production
Treating
Umgeni
Siza water
Collecting
Transferring
Treatment
Disposing of sewage
Distributing and selling of
clean water and charging for it
Figure 1. Water functions that can be performed by different
institutional arrangements
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structure is reviewed periodically in line with developments
taking place, including the consumer price index. SWC has no
voice in the negotiation and setting of bulk water tariff.
A degree of flexibility is awarded to the private operator for
devising the specific details of provision to poor users. The
levels of water and sanitation services provided by SWC include
(a) level 1 service is a water dispenser (typically a Bambamanzi
community standpipe pre-payment meter) with a
ventilation improved pit latrine for each household
(b) level 2 service provides a 200 l tank and a septic tank for
each household
(c) level 3 service is a full water connection with a flush toilet
for each household.
7. EVALUATION OF CASE STUDIES
7.1. Quality and quantity of service
The basis for awarding the Dolphin Coast concession was that
the concessionaire would provide a cost-effective and efficient
water and sanitation service to residents. According to workers,
management and councillors, frequent breakdowns occurred in
the first months of operation, however, these have been
drastically reduced and services were rapidly re-established after
breakdowns. In the Dolphin Coast, unaccounted water (or water
loss) dropped from over 30% to 16% in a period of one year.
Tariff collection rate increased from 75% to 97%. Three SWC
customer service centres became operational with established
payment procedures and a full-time community liaison officer
for disadvantaged areas. An earlier report established that
residents felt there had been rapid response to customer
complaints, with new standpipes and house connections in
disadvantaged areas and a service upgrade in other areas.13
The results from the Queenstown case study indicated a number
of technical improvements since establishment of the PPP,
including
(a) unaccounted water was an average of 18% in late 2002
(b) the number of pipe bursts is approximately 0.3 bursts/km
per annum
(c) the number of sewer outflows is approximately 10 per km
per annum in 2002
(d ) ageing pipes have been replaced in Mlungisi and eZibeleni.
Queenstown Municipal officials reported an increase in the
number of leaks fixed, attributed to the council’s new rebate
policy for dealing with leaks within the boundaries of residents’
properties. The water accounts of residents in poor areas are
checked for high consumption, an indicator of a possible leak. If
a leak is detected people are asked to repair the leaks and to
submit the receipt (from their plumbers) to the municipality.
Once this is done, a rebate is granted to the resident’s account.
7.2. Workers
Trade unions were engaged in the build-up to the concession in
the Dolphin Coast. After the announcement of the preferred
bidder in 1998, a period of negotiations with interested
stakeholders followed. Negotiations covered staff, assets,
investments and other issues, and Dolphin Coast municipal staff
were kept informed of all these deliberations. According to
councillors and officials, unions presented the greatest obstacle
to the borough initiative and the contract had to make
significant accommodation to union demands. Opposition was
finally overcome through high-level intervention from ministers
and ANC leaders. The concessionaire was obliged to employ
local people from the Dolphin Coast area and use local materials
wherever possible; the contract compels the use of labour-
intensive techniques where feasible, although there has been
criticism of the distribution of these jobs. An undertaking not to
terminate employment and to permit continued union activities
by workers was key to the concession.
Workers at SWC are divided over the change from municipality
to the private sector. Although there is appreciation of the
training that has been provided (driving licenses, literacy
training and module 2 plumbing courses), there is also criticism
that these new skills are not sufficiently used or rewarded.
In the Queenstown contract a consultative process took place
with stakeholders, including civic associations and organised
labour. All previous municipal employees opted to join the
concession company. There have been minimal labour
disruptions since the commencement of the contract. More job
opportunities have been created via community-based
construction programmes undertaken to extend services and
infrastructure to previously unserviced areas. Although workers
appreciated the training that has been provided (driving
licenses, literacy training and plumbing courses), there was also
criticism that these skills were not sufficiently used or rewarded.
7.3. Credit control
In Queenstown, ward councillors have become involved in
credit control and in arranging the reconnection of customers
who have been disconnected. Councillors and customers
together negotiate an arrangement to pay arrears in order to
avoid disconnection. The new credit control policy has
reportedly had a positive impact on the rate of payment for
services and has also reduced the number of disconnections in
the municipality. The council also developed an incentive
scheme to reward individuals who pay their outstanding
accounts with credit on the amount that has been paid.
However, in the Dolphin Coast it was reported that some
people who have household connections are reverting back to
using standpipes because they cannot afford their bills. In
discussion with council officials and the management of SWC,
it was stated that communities did not understand the
implications of full water and sewerage connections before
occupying their houses.
7.4. Customer management
Despite not being contractually liable for customer
management, in the Queenstown PPP WSSA has taken a
number of steps to assist with customer management. For
example, the company planned to set up a toll-free telephone
line as well as providing funding to the municipality for the
salaries of staff responsible for handling complaints regarding
water and sanitation. However, the residents of eZibeleni and
Mlungisi interface largely with ward councillors and other
municipal officials when they have queries or complaints and
the ward councillors then contact WSSA. One councillor said ‘if
there is a pipe burst in the middle of the night in my ward, I can
contact a senior official at WSSA directly’. Overall, residents
stated that they found it easier to deal with their councillors
than dealing with a private company.
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Customer service offices, which serve as contact points between
customers and SWC, have been opened in Dolphin Coast. In
addition, there is a telephone help line and newsletters have
been distributed by SWC with customers’ bills. Two full-time
community liaison officers from the BoDC deal with various
community issues including water and sanitation. They are
responsible for communication with the communities through
ward committees. Other communication channels used by SWC
to keep in touch with its stakeholders include community notice
boards in English and Zulu, face-to-face communication,
posters and flip charts, schools liaison, functions and activities,
regular contact with the BoDC and communication with
government and other organisations. Furthermore, the Dolphin
Coast contract compels the concessionaire (at the time of
submitting an annual report on service levels to the council) to
publish a summarised extract from the annual report on service
levels and inform customers of its existence.
7.5. Municipal tariffs for water and sanitation
The main danger to the poor under PPP water and sanitation
provision is that tariffs and/or connection charges become
unaffordable, meaning that this group does not gain access to
better water and sanitation services. 10% of income is generally
regarded as the maximum amount a household would be
prepared to allocate to service payments.
In 2000, Queenstown residents were charged for a minimum of
10 000 l at R2.42 per thousand litres. This meant that residents
who consumed anything between 0 and 10 000 l were still
required to pay R24.20 for their water. This tariff structure
changed as a result of the government’s free basic water policy
introduced after 2000. Currently, fixed monthly charges plus a
rising block rate apply to all consumers who consume more
than 6000 l of water per month; households consuming less
than 6000 l per month pay nothing. The major advantage of this
system is that it reduces the cost of service provision to small
users. When one compares what people paid for water in 2000
with current costs, then the present tariff structure benefits
those who consume less than 21 000 l per month. People
consuming more than 21 000 l are paying more for water (in
real terms) than they did in 2000 (see Table 414). Tariffs are
cheaper for poor residents and a rebate of 40% is offered for
households earning less than R1300 per month. However, levels
of non-payment for water and sanitation remain high due to
the high levels of poverty and low levels of employment in the
municipality.
The whole of the Dolphin Coast has only 4500 customers
(households). Average consumption per person in the better-off
eastern area is 260 l/day and about 47 l/day in the poor western
area. Residents pay for the amount of water consumed, a
standard charge built into water invoices and a sewerage tariff
based on the volume of water consumed. In the Dolphin Coast,
a three-tier system is in operation (Table 514). The first 10 000 l
is technically ‘free’, but limited to consumers with household
connections (i.e. not those who use standpipes), although every
connected household customer pays a standard connection
charge (approximately R24.60).
The question of fixed charges is a provocative issue in the
townships and is a heavy burden on the urban poor. The
increase in costs under private provision has led residents to
seek out alternative means, including using river water in the
rainy season to lessen their costs, which is not beneficial to the
user or the operator.
Sanitation is a particularly difficult service to provide under a
PPP. Respondents in both case studies were dissatisfied with the
increased sewerage costs that resulted from the PPP.
Nevertheless, despite being unaffordable, respondents showed
considerable resistance to accepting anything less than full-
service options, whether it was affordable or not.
7.6. Impact on low-income communities
In the Dolphin Coast, key pro-poor elements include tariff and
operational issues, an empowerment component, social
development and staff training. The Siza Water youth and
community development fund was set up with the primary
objective of ‘uplifting and development of the youth and
community within the concession area’. From its inception,
advocates of the Dolphin Coast concession stated that those
who could not pay for water would be provided for. A clause in
the contract stipulates that the council and the concessionaire
shall agree on methods whereby funds and/or other support are
given to assist indigent families to pay for the supply of basic
water services. Such assistance may be given by crediting
Consumption:
000 l
Consumption
charge: R
Basic charge:
R
0–6 0.00 0.00
6–20 2.26 18.38
21–50 2.26 28.88
>51 3.15 41.00
Table 4. Tariff structure for domestic customers in Queensland
(2002/2003)14
Tariff: R
1998/1999 1999/2000 2000/2001
Site-metered (basic charge per month) 20.00 20.00 24.60
0–10 000 l consumption 0.00 0.00 0.00
11–35 000 l consumption 2.23 2.45 2.74
>35 000 l consumption 2.92 3.15 3.60
Water dispensers per 000 l – 3.53 3.94
Table 5. Domestic water tariffs in Dolphin Coast in the period 1998–200115
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customers’ accounts, or by the provision of vouchers, coupons
or tokens. In fact, the study team found that none of these
provisions appeared to have been implemented. An underlying
barrier to the extension of formal services to illegal settlements
is land tenure, and regularising land tenure could be
considered as an appropriate role for the public sector within
the PPP.
The Queenstown PPP case study indicated that, while the
quality of supply had improved significantly at a broad scale,
the improvements had accrued largely to the municipality
(improved maintenance and reduction in aged pipes) and had
not been felt by poor households who are unhappy with tariff
issues and the way leaks on private property are dealt with.
In general, an examination of the issues related to the
contractual stage of the PPP process has shown that the needs
of poor users do not appear to be taken into account when the
initial decision to engage in a PPP arrangement is reached.
8. CONCLUSION
Following the GEAR programme in 1996, there was a visible
acceleration of privatisation in service delivery in South Africa.
While PPPs can work well, implementation of a concession
poses a number of risks to all. There are clear advantages in
spelling out these risks at an early stage of such an arrangement
so that the various stakeholders are aware of the pressures that
exist and are therefore more likely to approach negotiations
more realistically. These risks are summarised in Table 6.
Mechanisms by which risks to stakeholders can be mitigated
within PPP arrangements should be given further consideration.
A review of the concessions in Queenstown and Dolphin Coast
(see Table 7 for a comparison) concludes that for similar
Risk to concessionaire Risks to councils Risks to community
Non-payment by consumers Breach of contract by concessionaire Increases in tariff rates to consumers
Unreasonable bulk water tariff
increase
Revenue loss Cut-offs for non-payments and liability for
reconnection fees
Union action Poor service to residents Cherry picking of investments
Challenge of providing the lifeline tariff Unpopularity Accountability to the community
Municipal area requiring a huge capital/
infrastructure outlay
Unable to renegotiate contract Reduced access to alternatives such as community
sources and informal sector provision
Table 6. Risks in PPPs
Dolphin Coast Queenstown
Information and participation
prior to the concession
Communities were involved, but respondents
felt that there were either not involved or
only involved up to a certain level
Communities did not feel consulted
Training of workers Workers were trained Information not available
Remuneration of workers Static pay for last 2 years Information not available
Water supply breakdowns Used to be a problem, now under control Quality and quantity of supply reportedly
improved
Equipment Adequate Information not available
Tariffs Respondents felt they are too high Dissatisfaction with tariffs, felt to be unaffordable
Relationship with local
government
Good Mediation by ward councillors resulted in better
credit control policies
Relationship with concessionaire
management
Suspicious Suspicious
Relationship with councillor Working well Working well
Water quality SWC claim it is very good, but residents feel
it is questionable
Residents reported an improvement in water
quality
Community fund SWC claim community fund is uplifting the
community. However, the community does
not acknowledge this
Information not available
Concession status Working well but there is room for
improvement
Overall improvement in service delivery,
particularly around the area of quality of service
Unionisation Unions overcome initial problems Information not available
Table 7. Comparison of Dolphin Coast and Queenstown concessions
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ventures to succeed there is the need for
(a) a supportive, consistent legal and regulatory framework, for
example, the Municipal Systems Act that was developed to
build uniform regulation nationally
(b) coordination between national government and other
stakeholders
(c) financial and technical assistance to local authorities
(d ) a forum to resolve issues, e.g. on labour should be
established
(e) strong political will
( f ) evenly matched power to negotiate between council,
concession, and community15
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